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FAIR OR UNFAIR TRADE: DOES IT
MATTER?*
Andreas F Lowenfeld t
Like almost everyone else interested in an open trading system, I was
delighted when the Tokyo Round finally came off. Given all the tugs and
pulls, and the dangers that threatened on every side, it was in the end more
important that the seventh Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) could
be called a success than that any given issue-whether safeguards or
subsidies or government procurement or even cheese--came out right. I
want to start, therefore, by saluting those who made it possible, and in
particular Ambassador Robert Strauss, who proved that skill at deal-
making is more important than an appreciation of the fine points of the law
of GATT or the economics of international trade.
I make these initial remarks not only because I believe them to be true
and worth recognizing, but because I am anxious that what follows will not
be regarded as churlish. I do think the Tokyo Round was worthwhile,
indeed essential. I do not think any country, including the United States,
gave more than it got. I am afraid, however, that the fundamental
problems of our mature industrial societies were deflected rather than
squarely addressed in the MTN, and I am concerned that excessive
expectations will lead to excessive let-down, or excessive cynicism.
I
I believe the Tokyo Round was sold to all the participants-and cer-
tainly to Americans-as a way of restoring fairness in international trade.
"Of course we can and want to compete," went the slogan. "What needs to
be done is to separate fair and unfair trade, and then we can all benefit
from the advantages of an open market system, from specialization, com-
parative advantage, and rational allocation of resources." The analogy, in a
* Text based on a speech delivered by Professor Lowenfeld at a symposium at Cornell
Law School entitled LIBERAL TRADE AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND, February 22-23, 1980.
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1955,
Harvard University.
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real sense, is to the antitrust laws in the United States. Everyone is for an
open market and against special shelters, so long as it is clear that no one is
able to engage in predatory conduct, to abuse a dominant position, or to
prevent potential rivals from entering a market. My question is whether we
really mean all of that in the context of international trade.
The effort to separate fairness from unfairness in international trade
has taken, let's face it, some rather odd paths. Under the heading of
"dumping"-the premier sin of international trade-we make detailed in-
quiries about what an exporter charges for a product in his home market.'
Do we really care about that? Is it of any concern to the American worker
fearful for his job in Detroit what a Toyota costs in Nagoya? Is it any
comfort to him if, in response to an investigation or a lawsuit initiated in
the United States, the manufacturer in Japan lowers his domestic price? Oh
yes, I have heard the theory that excessive mark-ups in the home market
may "subsidize" exports. 2 I'm not sure anyone really believes that; I am
sure that no inquiry into dumping in this country or elsewhere undertakes
to prove it. The fact is that dumping as the GATT (and U.S. law) define
that term is hardly malurn in se. And it is malumprohibium only if another
element is added-injury to the importing country's industry or a portion of
that industry.3 And so we shift back from looking at conduct in the ex-
porter's country to looking at the effect in the importer's country.
We have had repeated episodes in the United States where an exporter
in country A is not "selling at less than fair value" because his home market
price (after all the mysterious debits and credits and currency conversions)
is not determined to be above his export price.4 Then exporter B, matching
A's prices, is determined to be dumping, because his home market prices
1. See, e.g., Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, § 201, 42 Stat. 11, as amended
by Trade Act of 1974, § 321, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (superseded by Trade Agreements Act of
1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-1673i (West 1980) (adding new §§ 731-740 to the Tariff Act
of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 687)); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done June 30, 1967, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. 4348, 4349-50, T.I.A.S.
No. 6431, at 3-4 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Antidumping Code]; General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, Art. VI(I), 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 212, reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as
GATT].
2. See K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 169
(1970). Professor Dam characterizes this theory as a "common fallacy." Id.
3. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1980) (ad-
ding new § 731 to the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 687); 1967 Antidumping Code, supra
note 1, arts. 3-4, 19 U.S.T., at 4351-53, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, at 5-7; GATT Art. VI(i).
4. See, e.g., The Wire Rod Cases: Steel Wire Rods From Japan, 28 Fed. Reg. 4,636
(1963) (Treasury determination that hot-rolled carbon steel wire rods from Japan not sold at
less than fair value within the meaning of § 201(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921).
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are higher.5 Finally, there is no remedy because A has taken enough of the
market so that B's participation is not deemed to be causing injury.6 I am
able, with some effort (and a massive Documents Supplement) to explain
that recurring situation to my well-prepared law students.7 Try to explain it
to the domestic competitor or his worker and you will see how hard it is.
Or, if the case comes out the other way, try to explain to the worker in B,
say Belgium, or to his employer, why, if his products sell in the United
States for the same price as A's products, one can and the other cannot
continue to be sold at that price.
So much for the moment for dumping, the sin we thought we knew
most about. In the Tokyo Round the main achievement, we are told, was
the joint assault on subsidies.8 Again, one might suggest that if the taxpay-
ers of Patria are content to contribute their sweat to the low prices in
Xandia, Xandians ought to be thankful and not upset. But nearly every-
body today is too smart for that little gambit. We understand that the con-
cern is not for the customer but for the competitor; that tariffs are the one
accepted currency of international trade; and that a subsidy at the ex-
porter's end undoes the tariff at the importer's end. The U.S. Congress, as
far back as 18979 and up to the 1974 Trade Act,' 0 was clear enough about
the point to authorize (and require) measures against subsidized products
only if the products were subject to import duties to begin with."I In other
5. See, e.g., Steel Wire Rods From France, 28 Fed. Reg. 5,392 (1963) (Treasury determi-
nation that hot-rolled carbon steel rods sold for less than fair value); Steel Wire Rods From
West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg. 3,364 (1963) (same); Steel Wire Rods From Luxembourg, 28
Fed. Reg. 2,927 (1963) (same); Steel Wire Rods From Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 2,747 (1963)
(same).
6. See, e.g., Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods From France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7,368 (1963)
(Tariff Commission determination of no injury or likelihood of injury); Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Wire Rods From West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,606 (1963) (same); Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Wire Rods From Luxembourg, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,476 (1963) (same); Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Wire Rods From Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,474 (1963) (same).
7. The cases cited in notes 4-6 supra, as well as the relevant statutes and international
agreements, are reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
163-75 and Documents Supplement (1979).
8. This assault resulted in the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles
VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/
NTM/W/236 [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code], reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN
THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as H.R. Doc. No. 153].
9. See Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151 (repealed by TariffAct of 1909, Pub. L.
No. 61-5, § 28, 36 Stat. 11).
10. See Trade Act of 1974, § 303(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1979).
11. Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 applied only to "merchandise... dutiable under
the provisions of this Act." Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (amended
1974). The Tariff Act of 1974 amended section 303 to apply also to articles not subject to
ordinary duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(3) (1976) (amended by Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 103, 93 Stat. 144). The 1974 Act required an injury determination
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words, if protection againstfair trade was not needed--either because the
United States had a real cost advantage or because the product was not
made in the United States in sufficient quantity-then there was no need to
protect against unfair trade. And so the importing country's remedy against
subsidy was born-a duty on top of another duty imposed by the importing
country equal (again assuming one could calculate it) to the subsidy be-
stowed by the exporting country.
The rest of the world did not agree that subsidies were malum in se
either, or in any event were worse than dumping. The framers of the
GATT not only decided that subsidies should be countervailed only in case
of material injury;' 2 in the one real prohibition on subsidies, the 1957 decla-
ration that in 1962 became Article XVI(4) of the General Agreement, 13 the
subscribing countries pledged to refrain only from subsidies that resulted in
an export price lower than the home market price, I e., a standard parallel
to the dumping standard. In the Tokyo Round, as everyone in the field
knows, the major achievement was acceptance by the United States of an
injury requirement before imposing a countervailing duty on imports of
subsidized products.' 4 It is rather interesting that this was thought of as a
major achievement by the Europeans. My own impression is that (at least
until 1974) the United States practically never imposed countervailing du-
ties except in the case of a complaint by an industry that kept nagging the
Treasury, and the nagging was not so different from what will now be re-
quired in a more formal demonstration of injury. i It is true that we did
not have the two-step process of determination first by the Treasury and
then by the Tariff Commission or International Trade Commission. But
the idea that the United States was going around punishing conduct that it
but not others considered bad even though it did no one any real harm, i e.,
that the United States was going around enforcing laws against victimless
crimes, was always much more theoretical than real.
in the case of these previously nondutiable products to comply with GATT Article VI. The
U.S. exemption from the requirement of GATT Article VI did not apply to legislation enacted
after the United States became a member of GATT. See Protocol of Provisional Application
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A-2051 (1947), reprintedin 4 BISD at
77.
12. GATT Art. VI(6)(a).
13. See GATT Art. XVI(4), BISD (9th Supp.) 32 (1961). See also d. at 185 (report of the
working party that developed the Declaration).
14. See Subsidies Code, supra note 8, arts. 2(1), 4(3), & 6, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 261-62,
267, 272-75. The corresponding amendment to U.S. law appears in the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (West 1980) (adding new § 701 to the Tariff Act of 1930).
15. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671a-1671d (West 1980)
(adding new sections 702-705 to the Tariff Act of 1930).
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What did the United States get in return for its "concession?" Well for
one thing, the prohibition on subsidies with respect to industrial products
from developed countries was made explicit, and was linked to a quite use-
ful illustrative list of prohibited devices.16 For another, provision was made
for a two-track complaint procedure, so that the countervailing duty was
not the only remedy and an importing country was not the only party that
might take action against a prohibited subsidy. 17 A third change, largely
overlooked in the commentary that I have seen, was the elimination of the
comparison between home market and export price for subsidized prod-
ucts.' 8 I think these steps taken together represent improvement, though a
rather small step from the point of view of the American position, because
subsidies on production, in contrast with subsidies on exports, were merely
recognized but not forbidden.19
But having gone through these finger exercises with you, let me repeat
my earlier question. Does it really make any difference to the United States
as an importing country whether a home-market price is higher or lower or
the same as an export price? The fact that that question will continue to be
asked with respect to dumping2 o but will no longer be asked with respect to
subsidies suggests that we are not sure. I had always thought that business
or labor in a domestic industry upset by imports didn't draw any distinction
between dumping and subsidies-that was the concern of lawyers or
bureaucrats. So long as one could label the competition as "unfair," one
might secure protection against it without offending against the overall per-
ceived advantages of an open trading system.
Putting that point another way, our ambivalence toward free trade on
one side and protection on the other is neatly coped with when we can shift
the focus from the importing to the exporting country. The real concern
however, is with the impact in the importing country, whether we call it
16. See Subsidies Code, supra note 8, art. 9 and Annex, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 278.
17. Id. arts. 12-13, 17-18, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 282-83, 288-91.
18. Of course, signatories to the Subsidies Code never intended it to be an amendment to
the GATT. Nevertheless, the Code contains no statement comparable to the directive of
GATT Article XVI(4):
[Clontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of sub-
sidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in
the sale of such productfor export at aprice lower than the comparable price chargedfor
the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
(emphasis added).
19. Compare Subsidies Code, supra note 8, art. 8(3), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 277, ("any
subsidy") with id. arts. 8(2) and 9, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 277, 278, ("export subsidies"). See
also id. art. 11, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 279-81 (list of six potential objectives achievable
through the use of subsidies other than export subsidies).
20. See, e.g., 1967 Antidumping Code, supra note 1, art. 2(a), 19 U.S.T. at 4349, T.I.A.S.
No. 6431, at 3.
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"material injury," "market disruption," or whatever. Whether the compet-
ing exporter lowers his home country costs or prices, whether his taxes are
direct or indirect, remitted or lowered, is on the whole beside the point,
except to some Olympian economist or econometrician who works out a
truly rational allocation of resources. In the Smith/Ricardo model, the ef-
fort to measure true (as contrasted with distorted) costs is important, be-
cause the resources dedicated to the comparatively higher cost industry in
the importing country will be shifted to other products. The English vint-
ners will grow flax and produce linen, and the Portuguese weavers will turn
to the vineyards. 2 1 I violate no confidence in suggesting that outside of
college economics texts, people don't act according to that model, except
over quite a long term.
From the time we began to engage in sectoral trade negotiations for
steel, pulp and paper, aluminum, chemicals, and textiles during the Ken-
nedy Round, and even more in the Tokyo Round, we recognized that we no
longer, at least wholeheartedly, believe in comparative advantage as framed
by Smith, Ricardo, and Mill. No one says that Japanese should build all
the cars and TV sets and Americans should grow all the rice and soybeans.
We do in fact think in terms of comparative efficiency, product-by-product,
not comparative advantage as if factors of production in all countries were
mobiles on a chart. We may compare Toyota with Chrysler or Ford, but
certainly not with Pillsbury Mills or Boeing. I think that means we-and I
refer to all industrial nations-are concerned about market share, import
penetration, and similar terms looking to the importing, not to the export-
ing country.
II
It is very interesting that the one exercise that was supposed to address
the question of market share in the Tokyo Round, the so-called Safeguards
Code,2 2 failed to be carried to conclusion, though one still hears that negoti-
ations will resume.23 The public story is that the Safeguards Code failed
for lack of agreement about selectivity, te., whether importing countries
21. See D. RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, ch. VII
(1817).
22. The draft of the Safeguards Code is reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-
560 to DS-571.
23. A draft of the Safeguards Code, with many critical points left blank, was circulated in
January, 1979 as part of the consultations initiated by President Carter pursuant to § 102(e) of
the Trade Act of 1974. See 44 Fed. Reg. 1,933, 1,936 (1979). Cf. GATT Doc. GATT/1234
(April 12, 1979) (signatories agreed that the negotiations should continue "with the objective of
reaching agreement before 15 July 1979"), quoted in Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 174 (1979).
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could depart from Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to protect them-
selves against imports that didn't qualify under the definition of unfair
competition.24 I have a feeling that while the selectivity issue was real
enough, the failure ran deeper. Discussion of a Safeguards Code-i e., a set
of rules about protection against "fair" imports-raises the issues of market
share, and of levels of tolerance for imports, that no one has been prepared
to face, except ad hoc. The Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) for steel in the
United States,25 the Simonet-Davignon Plans for the same products in the
European Community,26 the international aspects of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy,27 and the various textile agreements 28 are all manifestations of
a concern about imports in a greater amount than is acceptable, or at prices
inconsistent with targets set for reasons other than the economists' dream of
prices approaching costs of the most efficient producers. Neither in
automobiles nor, for the most part, in grains or textiles are practices by
exporters "unfair" within the accepted rules. The crises are real enough,
but they turn on the value of imports, not on the difference between fair and
unfair conduct by the exporters.
Take the trigger price mechanism established in the United States at
the beginning of 1978 to control imports of steel.29 The alleged statutory
authority under U.S. trade law was the antidumping law.30 But with re-
spect to imports from Japan, no effort was made to prove that imports were
coming in at prices below those charged in Japan. With respect to imports
from the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as from other coun-
tries, no effort was made to exclude imports that were coming in below
foreign prices-the traditional (and statutory) definition of dumping-so
24. See, e.g., id.
25. See "Trigger Prices" for Imported Steel Mill Products, 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464 (1978),
reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-490.
26. See Common Steel Policy, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 303) 3 (1976); Commission
Decision No. 3017/76/ECSC of 8 Dec. 1976, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 344) 34 (1976).
27. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957,
arts. 38-47, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 30-36.
28. See, e.g., Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, BISD (21st Supp.) 3
(1975).
29. See note 25 supra. See generally A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 255-65 and DS-490
to DS-518; A Comprehensive Program For the Steel Industry: Report to the President (sub-
mitted by Anthony M. Solomon, Chrnn., Administration Task Force, Dec. 6, 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A Comprehensive Program For the Steel Industry], reprinted in Administration's
Comprehensive Program For the Steel Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade ofthe
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Steel
Industry Hearings].
30. Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, § 205, 42 Stat. 11, as amended by Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1976) (repealed 1979). See also A Comprehensive Program for
the Steel Industry, reprinted in Steel Industry Hearings, supra note 29, at 17.
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long as the price was above the trigger price set by the U.S. government. 3'
And how was that price set? U.S. government officials were careful to point
out that the trigger price was not like the target price for grains in the EEC's
Common Agricultural Policy, because it was determined by external and
not internal factors. 32 That was indeed an important difference. An ex-
porter seeking to sell grains to the Community could not gain greater access
by lowering his prices; the variable levy would simply be increased corre-
spondingly. By contrast, a Japanese exporter (or at least all Japanese ex-
porters) might, by reducing their costs, be able to reduce the trigger price,
which was based on the computed costs of the Japanese steel industry.33 If
during a recession, Japanese mill-owners were prepared to keep producing
and exporting with a four percent profit, was that an unfair trade practice?
I know of no rule in GATT or elsewhere that prescribes a given margin of
profit.
In fact, the TPM was the perfect straddle. There was enough of an
aura of unfairness about lower-priced imports to take the onus, or some of
the onus, off the American steel industry that for a variety of reasons had
lost some of its competitive strength. There was also sufficient evidence of
unemployment, plant closings, rising inventories, and falling profits to
make out a case for special treatment for steel without going through the
elaborate procedures of an escape clause action.34 To me, the motive was
clear. Domestic industry and labor were to be given some shelter, but not
complete protection. A rough calculation seems to have been made of what
was a tolerable level of capacity utilization by the domestic industry, and
what was an acceptable level of imports.35
The corresponding program in the European Community, known usu-
ally as the Davignon Plan, was even more clearly based on calculation of a
31. Cf id. at 21 ("The implementation of the trigger price mechanism may not prevent
less efficient producers from selling steel products at less than "fair value" within the meaning
of the Antidumping Act."). The report clearly stated, however, that an affected U.S. industry
was free to "pursue the traditional remedies under the Antidumping Act if that appeared ap-
propriate." Id See also id. at 229 (testimony of Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel for
Tariff Affairs, Treasury Dept.) ("Treasury would not self-initiate [an investigation] where sales
were above the trigger price mechanism because under those circumstances there was no exter-
nal reason for Treasury to believe injury would result.").
32. See A. LOWENFELD, sUpra note 7, at 266-67.
33. Note, however, that the U.S. Government added to its already difficult calculations of
actual costs a seven percent mark-up for overhead and eight percent of all non-capital costs for
profits. See Revisions By Treasury Steel Trigger Price Task Force, 43 Fed. Reg. 32,710 (1978).
34. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-284, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394 (1976) Seegenerall Jacobs &
Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import Competition in the United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. l,
21-23 (1980).
35. For a discussion by the person who actually performed the calculations of the trigger
price for steel, see Crandall, Competition and 'Dumping" in the U.S. Steel Market, CHAL-
LENGE, July-Aug. 1978, at 13.
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share of the domestic market. Condensing for the sake of brevity a series of
measures that were not all taken at once, the European Commission set
prices for given products some twenty percent above market prices, im-
posed and allocated production quotas for steel mills within the Commu-
nity, and then looked for a way to prevent imports (not only from Japan but
from Spain, Australia, and most important, the East European countries)
from interfering with the domestic program. The remedy hit upon was to
publish a reference price (using incidentally, the calculations made by the
United States for its TPM) below which products would be considered to be
dumped. 36
To be sure, an exporter might have brought a complaint proceeding
under Article XXIII of the GATT,37 or even under the Community's own
procedures. 38 Meanwhile, however, the "antidumping duties" would be in
place. But if the exporting country would agree to an orderly marketing
agreement, with prices four to six percent below the Community's reference
price and a volume restraint nine percent below 1976 shipments, the Com-
munity would suspend the antidumping proceedings.3 9
In short, an accusation of unfair trade was made in order to develop a
fast-track remedy against interference with a domestic support program.
But the threat of imposing the remedy was used to exact an agreed "safe-
guard," i e., a solution normally reserved for disruptive effects of fair
trade. 40
I bring these cases up not to point a finger at the United States or at the
European Community, but to point out how indistinct the difference be-
tween fair and unfair trade has become. Just to mention one more episode,
still developing as these remarks are being made, I found it fascinating that
the European Community, after complaining for weeks about subsidization
36. The various phases of the Davignon Plan were announced in successive issues of the
Official Journal of the European Communities. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 3004/77
ECSC of Dec. 28, 1977, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 352) 13 (1977); Common Steel Policy, 19
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 303) 3 (1976); Commission Decision No. 3017/76/ECSC of 8 Dec.
1976, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 344) 24 (1976). No comprehensive statement of the Plan was
ever published. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 278-304 for a chronology and more
detailed description of the Davignon Plan.
37. GATT Art. XXIII.
38. See generally Van Bael, Ten Years of EEC Antildumping Enforcement, 13 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 395, 395-401 (1979).
39. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 292. The European Community entered into
such agreements with Australia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Japan, South Africa, Spain, and,
under slightly different terms, with all of the steel-producing countries of the EFTA (Austria,
Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). Id. at 292-93.
40. In fact, even before the steel crisis became acute in Europe, the EEC seems to have
used the antidumping laws more as a form of pressure to secure restraint agreements than as a
means of actually policing unfair trade. See Van Bael, supra note 38, at 397-98.
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and other unfair practices in the United States with regard to petroleum-
based synthetic fibers, took action to restrain imports not under the Subsi-
dies Code (or Article VI) but under Article XIX of the GATT. There may
be several explanations. Subsidies, especially export subsidies, might be
hard to prove or a countervailing duty may not have been thought as effec-
tive as an immediate import quota. But when you come right down to it,
whether United States exporters were competing fairly or unfairly was far
from the prime concern of the authorities in London or Brussels, let alone
in Belfast. It would sound good to scream "foul!," but the claim was largely
irrelevant. The real focus, quite clearly, was on the importing, not the ex-
porting country.
III
What is the acceptable level of market penetration for foreign goods?
Obviously the answer is different for different countries, different products,
different times. It is easy, indeed, to say that this is a political question. I
would not deny that. But I don't think it follows that either economists or
lawyers can afford therefore to shrug their shoulders and turn away. For
the lawyers, the task remains of turning shared perceptions into more or less
articulate formulas. Typically, the lawyer's response will be to replace sub-
stance by procedure, say a requirement that this or that "fact" be deter-
mined by a commission, perhaps national, perhaps international, or that
this or that party will have the "burden of proof," or that factors "including
but not limited to" the following shall be considered in making the determi-
nation. Economists may add some additional advice, such as the period of
time in which (1) to measure an increase in imports to see whether it is
excessive, or (2) to give breathing room to the endangered industry to make
it shape up.
In fact, the list of criteria in the 1967 Antidumping Code4t and the
1979 Subsidies Code42 would do quite well for an inquiry into injury
caused by increased imports that can not be characterized as unfair. The
only difference, perhaps, is the adjective that modifies the word injury-
"material," "substantial," "serious"-or in the Subsidies Code, no adjective
at all. 43
41. 1967 Antidumping Code, supra note 1, arts. 3(b)-(d), 19 U.S.T. at 4351-52, T.I.A.S.
No. 6431, at 5-6.
42. Subsidies Code, supra note 8, arts. 6(2)-(5), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 272-74.
43. Although Article 6 of the Subsidies Code refers only to the word "injury," a footnote
to Article 2(1) explains "that the term 'injury' shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to
mean material injury to a domestic industry." Subsidies Code, supra note 8, art. 2(l), H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 262 n.l.
FAIR OR UNFAIR TRADE
I understand that these adjectives have been fought over with great
tenacity, both in Geneva and in Washington. Having never been directly
bloodied by one of these battles, I am perhaps not as sensitive to the fine
distinctions as I should be. Let me take you through another brief finger
exercise, however, the escape clause in the United States trade legislation,
which as you know is the starting point for "import relief' in cases where
unfair competition cannot be shown. In the Trade Agreements Act of 1951,
as amended in the course of the 1950's, 44 the criterion for import relief was
that [1] any product on which a concession has been granted under a trade
agreement, is [2] "as a result in whole or in part of the duty. . . reflecting
such concession, [3] being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities, either actual or relative, as to [4] cause or threaten serious injury
to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. '45
Point [4] was explained further by a statement in the statute that [5]
"[i]ncreased imports. . . shall be considered as the cause [of injury] ...
when the Commission finds that [they] have contributed substantially to-
wards causing or threatening serious injury to such industry."' 46
In the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,47 criterion (1), limiting relief to
products on which a trade agreement concession had been granted, re-
mained intact; criterion (2) was changed to read "as a result in major part,"
rather than "in whole or in part" of the concession; criterion (3), describing
the increase in imports as either actual or relative was eliminated; criterion
(4) about causation remained intact.4 8 Criterion (5), however, was changed
from "increased imports that have contributed substantially" to "have been
the major factor" in causing, or threatening to cause serious injury.4 9
These changes were seen at the time as a victory for international trade
and defeat for the forces of protection.50 Later, of course, as it was realized
that adjustment assistance and orderly marketing agreements were linked
to the same criteria, there was something of a change of heart in Congress,
and perhaps also in the Executive Branch.5 ' In the Trade Act of 1974,52
44. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 72, as amended
by Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673.
45. Id. § 6(a) (repealed by Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 257(e)(1),
76 Stat. 872).
46. Id. § 7(b) (emphasis added).
47. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (current version codi-
fied in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
48. Id. § 301(b)(1).
49. Id. § 301(b)(3) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEO. L.J. 425, 442-48, 466-69
(1963).
51. See, e.g., Metzger, Adjstment Assistance, in I UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 334-38 (Comm'n on Int'l Trade and Invest-
ment Policy ed. 1971).
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criterion (1) (the link between increased imports and a trade agreement
concession) was eliminated; criterion (3) was changed back so that an in-
crease in imports could again be either absolute or relative; and criterion (5)
describing the causal connection between imports and injury was changed
back to "a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof."5 3 These
were clearly changes in the direction of protection. If the principal cause of
the increased imports was lower costs and therefore lower prices in the ex-
porting country, import relief might still be granted, regardless of what had
happened to tariffs. Moreover, even if an American industry's troubles
could be laid largely to a fall in domestic demand attributable to a reces-
sion, import relief could be granted, as in the Specialty Steel Case, if in-
creased imports were also an "important cause of injury and not less in
importance than the recession."5 4
In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,55 the provisions of U.S. law
dealing with import relief for "fair" trade were not changed. With respect
to "unfair" trade, however, Congress was quite active in the three-cornered
negotiations with Ambassador Strauss and the European Community. Af-
ter much haggling, the criterion for imposing either antidumping or coun-
tervailing duties was finally agreed to read "material injury."'56 The
legislative history and popular understanding suggest that this standard is
different from the escape clause standard, at least in the quantum of injury
needed to authorize relief.5 7 I am not sure the words of the statute fully
bear out this understanding, except that price seems to play a somewhat
greater role in the dumping/subsidies context.5 8
52. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976) (amended 1979).
53. Id. § 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(I) (1976).
54. See INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STAINLESS STEEL AND ALLOY TOOL STEEL: REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-5, at 13, U.S.I.T.C. Publ. 756 (1976), Presi-
dent Ford's action on that Report is recorded in Prod. 4445, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,101 (1976), cor-
rected in 41 Fed. Reg. 29,089 (1976).
55. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
56. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(2) (West 1980) (adding new § 701(a)(2) to the Tariff Act of
1930). The statute now defines "material injury" as "harm which is not inconsequential, im-
material, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7) (West 1980) (adding new § 771(7) to the
Tariff Act of 1930).
57. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979), where the House Comm.
on Ways and Means stated:
[Tihe Committee does not view overall injury caused by unfair competition, such as
dumping, to require as strong a causation link to unfairly competitive imports as
would be required for determining the existence of injury under fair trade conditions.
See also S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1979).
58. For example, § 201(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 225(b)(2) (1976)
(amended 1979), contains no provision corresponding to the new § 771(7)(c)(ii) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7) (West 1980).
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It is interesting to compare side-by-side the criteria for import relief
under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("fair" competition) and section
771(7) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 ("unfair" competition):
1974 Act 1979 Act
(2) In making its determinations under
paragraph (1), the Commission shall take
into account all economic factors which it
considers relevant, including (but not limited
to)-
(A) with respect to serious injury, the
significant idling of productive facilities in
the industry, the inability of a significant
number of firms to operate at a reasonable
level of profit, and significant unemploy-
ment or underemployment within the in-
dustry;
(B) with respect to threat of serious in-
jury, a decline in sales, a higher and grow-
ing inventory, and a downward trend in
production, profits, wages or employment
(or increasing underemployment) in the
domestic industry concerned; and
(C) with respect to substantial cause, an
increase in imports (either actual or rela-
tive to domestic production) and a decline
in the proportion of the domestic market
supplied by domestic producers.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term
"substantial cause" means a cause which is
important and not less than any other
cause.
5 9
(C) EVALUATION OF VOLUME AND OF
PRICE EFFECTS.-For purposes of subpara-
graph (B)-
(i) VOLUME.-In evaluating the volume
of imports of merchandise, the Commis-
sion shall consider whether the volume of
imports of the merchandise, or any in-
crease in that volume, either in absolute
terms or relative to production or con-
sumption in the United States, is signifi-
cant.
(ii) PICE.-In evaluating the effect of
imports of such merchandise on prices, the
Commission shall consider whether-
(I) there has been significant price un-
dercutting by the imported merchandise
as compared with the price of like prod-
ucts of the United States, and
(II) the effect of imports of such mer-
chandise otherwise depresses prices to a
significant degree or prevents price in-
creases, which otherwise would have oc-
curred, to a significant degree.
(iii) IMPACT ON AFFECTED INDUSTRY-
In examining the impact on the affected in-
dustry, the Commission shall evaluate all
relevant economic factors which have a
bearing on the state of the industry, includ-
ing, but not limited to-
(I) actual and potential decline in out-
put, sales, market share, profits, produc-
tivity, return on investments, and
utilization of capacity,
(II) factors affecting domestic prices,
and
(III) actual and potential negative ef-
fects on cash flow, inventories, employ-
ment, wages, growth, ability to raise
capital, and investment.
6 0
It may be that there is a difference in the burdens of proof placed on
the parties, although my impression is that burden of proof in the sense that
lawyers are familiar with the term in, say, determining the issue of contrib-
59. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1976) (amended 1979).
60. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(C) (West 1980).
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utory negligence in an automobile accident, simply does not exist in deter-
minations of the kind we are talking about.
I don't want, in raising the question of burden of proof, to be distracted
to a side issue. The central point I want to make is that for both "fair" and
"unfair" trade we now have very similar (if not quite congruent) criteria
which look to the importing and not to the exporting country. I understand
that in close cases, the International Trade Commission in the United
States is more likely to find injury after there has been a finding of dumping
or subsidization by the executive branch (formerly Treasury, now Com-
merce).6' Certainly a lawyer retained to seek import relief for a domestic
industry will make every effort to frame his petition in terms of unfair for-
eign practices-typically dumping or subsidization-if at all possible. But
at bottom, the concern is the impact of the imports on the domestic indus-
try, i e., on the question of injury.
IV
How does the GATT fit into all this? I had thought that the power to
take emergency action against particular imports under Article XIX by sus-
pending the importing country's GATT obligations 62 retained the link that
the United States has now discarded between increased imports and tariff
concessions. The link does not seem to be exclusive, however, and other
kinds of obligations under the GATT may provide the causal element, pro-
vided they result in unforeseen threats of serious injury. Professor Jackson
suggests in his treatise that the obligation that caused or threatens injury
may be the promise not to impose quotas, and the unforeseen developments
may be the increased imports themselves.63 If that is so, there really is no
requirement of causation at all other than the fact of an increase in imports;
the only real condition for invoking Article XIX is the existence of injury. I
find it hard to believe that the word "serious" before injury in Article XIX
is powerfully different from the word "material" before injury in Article
VI.64
61. In a recent case, the International Trade Commission divided on the question of cau-
sation and injury. See Perchloroethylene from Belgium, France, and Italy, U.S.I.T.C. Publ.
969 (1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 22,217 (1979). It seems unlikely that in such a borderline case, import
relief would have been available on the basis of an injury standard alone, without the added
insight of a Treasury finding of "unfair competition," (sales at less than fair value within the
meaning of the Antidumping Act).
62. GATT Art. XIX.
63. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 559-60 (1969).
64. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. No adjective modifies "injury" in the Sub-
sidies Code. Subsidies Code, supra note 8, art. 2(l), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 261-62.
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In all events, I think it is clear that the GATT deals with the problem
of import penetration, however we define it, quite inadequately. The Safe-
guards Code might have helped fill out the concept of market disruption,
again partly by setting forth some agreed definitions as to cause and effect,
partly by providing some procedures for making the required determina-
tions, and partly by prescribing what remedies may or may not be imposed
and for how long. I would have liked to go one step further and create an
independent role for the Director General of GATT-if not as a universal
attorney general, at least as a public monitor of both unilateral remedies
against market disruption and of bilateral or multilateral "settlements." 65
But again to follow this through would be a distraction from the limited
point I want to raise here.
I think we make a mistake in focusing as heavily as we did in the past
year in Geneva and in Washington on the difference between fair and un-
fair trade. I think the real focus is on acceptable vs. unacceptable levels of
trade or market share or import penetration, however the concept is formu-
lated. So long as we are not willing to legislate world-wide uniformity in
wage scales, exchange rates, environmental controls, debt/equity ratios, de-
preciation, interest rates, and accounting techniques, and indeed compara-
ble relations between government and industry, what is fair and what is
unfair is in large part coincidence. I would like to see a Safeguards Code
(with or without selectivity), because I think such a Code might achieve or
record a degree of common understanding about how people and nations
really feel about trade in products that both importing and exporting coun-
tries are able to produce. If we achieve such a Code, the need for Subsidies
or Antidumping Codes may well recede. Until there is agreement on a
Safeguards Code-by whatever name--the work of the Tokyo Round is, in
my view, far from complete.
65. Cf. ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, GATT PLuS-A PROPOSAL FOR
TRADE REFORM 43-44 (1976) (recommending public scrutiny and approval or disapproval by
a Trade Council of all measures limiting import competition, whether voluntary or not, and
whether by industry-wide agreements or by governmental arrangements).
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